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THE ROLE OF DESIGN CHOICE IN 





When is it appropriate for courts to second-guess decisions of 
private actors in shaping their business models, designing their 
networks, and configuring the (otherwise non-infringing) products 
that they offer to their customers? This theme appears periodically 
but persistently in intellectual property and antitrust, especially in 
disputes involving networks and technology. In both contexts, 
courts routinely invoke what I call a “non-interference principle”—
the presumption that market forces ordinarily bring the best 
outcomes for consumers, and that courts and regulators should not 
meddle in the process. This non-interference principle means, for 
example, that intermediaries need not design their networks to 
optimize enforcement of intellectual property rights, and 
monopolists need not consider the effects on competitors when they 
devise and sell new products. 
Yet in both contexts, on rare occasions, courts deem the non-
interference principle inapplicable and find liability, at least in 
part, based on a party’s choice of product design. Although 
intellectual property and antitrust scholars have each addressed 
judicial treatment of product design within their discipline, 
commentators have given little attention to similarities and 
differences between how the non-interference principle plays out in 
each context. Such an investigation yields interesting insights 
about the values underlying non-interference, and has implications 
for judges applying the principle in both intellectual property and 
antitrust law. This essay explores the non-interference principle in 
intellectual property and antitrust law, with an eye toward the 
factors that determine its applicability across the two doctrinal 
contexts. 
 
 *   Professor & Law Alumni Scholar, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to 
Paul Gugliuzza and to participants in the Digital Broadband Migration conference at 
the University of Colorado Law School for helpful comments and suggestions. 
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When is it appropriate for courts to second-guess decisions of 
private actors in shaping their business models, designing their 
networks, and configuring the (otherwise non-infringing) products 
that they offer to their customers? This theme appears 
periodically but persistently in intellectual property (IP) and 
antitrust law, especially in disputes involving networks and 
technology. In both contexts, courts routinely invoke what I call a 
“non-interference principle”—the presumption that market forces 
ordinarily bring the best outcomes for consumers, and that courts 
and regulators should not meddle in the process.1 This non-
interference principle means, for example, that intermediaries 
need not design their networks to optimize enforcement of IP 
rights,2 and monopolists need not consider the effects on 
competitors when they devise and sell new products.3 
 
 1. See Stacey L. Dogan, Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion: A Tale of 
Two Approaches to Intermediary Liability Online, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 503, 505–07 
(2014) (discussing non-interference principle in trademark and copyright law); see 
generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(“Antitrust scholars have long recognized the undesirability of having courts oversee 
product design, and any dampening of technological innovation would be at cross-
purposes with antitrust law.”); see infra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.  
 2. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2012); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 
19, 35 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that copyright’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act “is 
incompatible with a broad common law duty to monitor or otherwise seek out 
infringing activity based on general awareness that infringement may be occurring”). 
 3. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“As 
a general rule, courts are properly very skeptical about claims that competition has 
been harmed by a dominant firm’s product design changes. . . . In a competitive 
market, firms routinely innovate in the hope of appealing to consumers, sometimes in 
the process making their products incompatible with those of rivals; the imposition of 
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Yet in both contexts, on rare occasions, courts deem the non-
interference principle inapplicable and find liability, at least in 
part, based on a party’s choice of product design. In antitrust, this 
can occur, for example, through a finding of so-called “predatory 
innovation”—when a monopolist alters its product or service in a 
way that harms competitors with little or no redeeming benefits.4 
In IP, courts may impose liability against parties whose products 
have no substantial non-infringing use, who structure their 
operations to avoid knowledge of infringement, or whose product 
design supports a finding of inducement.5 These courts routinely 
invoke the non-interference principle even as they find liability 
under the facts of the case before them. And inevitably, the 
decisions trigger condemnation by scholars and advocates 
concerned about judicial meddling with the course of innovation. 
A review of these opinions and their critical reception reveals 
some interesting commonalities, but also some differences, 
between how antitrust and IP experts view the relationship 
between the non-interference principle and the law’s normative 
goals. The similarities come mostly in the easy cases. There is a 
widespread consensus, for example, that a monopolist introducing 
a product that reflects no improvements, and whose sole purpose 
is to impede entry by competitors, has violated the antitrust laws.6 
Similarly, IP law reaches parties that offer products or services 
with no conceivable use except for infringement.7 In both of these 
contexts, judicial intervention promotes the law’s goals without 
unduly threatening competing interests. At the other extreme, 
courts consistently reject claims based on product innovation that 
may have adverse effects on competitors or IP rights-holders, but 
whose principal purpose and effect are pro-competitive and non-
infringing.8 
 
liability when a monopolist does the same thing will inevitably deter a certain amount 
of innovation . . . .”). See generally PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 776a (4th ed. 2013) (“A dominant firm may alter its product to the 
detriment of smaller rivals, particularly those making complementary products.”). 
 4. E.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see 
infra notes 134–138 and accompanying text. 
 5. E.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); see infra note 
16 and accompanying text. 
 6. See, e.g., Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 
F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2010); cf. Daniel A. Crane, Search Neutrality as an Antitrust 
Principle, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1199, 1207–08 (2012) (contending that antitrust 
liability against search engines should be limited, among other things, to acts “without 
any reasonably believed efficiency justification”). 
 7. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012). 
 8. E.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 
1979) (“Because . . . a monopolist is permitted, and indeed encouraged, by § 2 to 
compete aggressively on the merits, any success that it may achieve through ‘the 
process of invention and innovation’ is clearly tolerated by the antitrust laws.”) 
(quoting United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass. 
1953)); Sony v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding no contributory 
copyright liability against manufacturer of product whose predominant use was non-
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The challenge, not surprisingly, comes in the middle, with 
products and services whose purpose and effect are more 
ambiguous. Here, courts and commentators struggle over the 
relevance of two variables: the relative scale of the product’s 
beneficial versus harmful effects, and the availability, cost, and 
feasibility of design alternatives that might shift those 
proportions. In theory, the non-interference principle makes the 
latter variable irrelevant, but in practice, it often plays a role in 
the analysis. The nature (and, indeed, the existence) of that role 
depends on a number of factors, some of which are irrelevant 
under the formal legal standards. Intent, for example, can play an 
outsized role in IP and antitrust cases, despite antitrust 
authorities’ insistence on anticompetitive effect, not 
anticompetitive animus, as the central question in monopolization 
suits.9 In both IP and antitrust, moreover, design choices that 
might not alone justify liability can combine with other acts to 
meet the relevant threshold. Perhaps one of the most noteworthy 
factors in determining the weight of the non-interference principle 
is the relevant authority’s personal view of the legitimacy and 
importance of antitrust or IP law in our society. In other words, a 
judge or scholar’s instincts about whether to second-guess 
“innovations” in antitrust and IP cases depends largely on the 
individual’s normative views about the importance of the interests 
on the other side. Because antitrust skepticism often aligns with 
IP optimism and vice versa, the same commentator may treat the 
non-interference principle as inviolable in one context, but 
optional in the other. 
Although IP and antitrust scholars have each addressed 
judicial treatment of product design within their discipline,10 
commentators have given little attention to similarities and 
differences between how the non-interference principle plays out 
in each context. Scholars and courts tend to stick to one doctrinal 
framework and to treat non-interference as a subsidiary precept of 
that area of law. In doing so, they have missed an opportunity to 
investigate fully the rationale and the limits of non-interference as 
a generalized principle. Such an investigation yields interesting 
insights about the values underlying non-interference, and has 
implications for judges applying the principle in both IP and 
antitrust law. 
This essay explores the non-interference principle in IP and 
 
infringing). 
 9. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, ¶ 775c (describing inquiry into 
intent as “the worst way of handling claims that innovation violates the antitrust 
laws”). 
 10. E.g., Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Anticompetitive Innovation and the 
Quality of Invention, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2012); R. Anthony Reese, The 
Problems of Judging Young Technologies: A Comment on Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the 
Problem of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 877 (2005). 
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antitrust law, with an eye toward the factors that determine its 
applicability across the two doctrinal contexts. Part I begins by 
defining the principle and examining its underlying logic. It 
describes three intersecting reasons that courts hesitate to 
scrutinize design decisions: concerns about error costs, supervision 
costs, and chill and interference with legitimate trade. Part II 
looks at non-interference in practice, examining and comparing its 
application in IP and antitrust law. It identifies interesting 
parallels between the two contexts, including the persistence of 
uncertainty and conflicting authority over when and why courts 
must leave design decisions alone. In Part III, I offer suggestions 
for resolving this uncertainty in a way that addresses the concerns 
underlying non-interference, while avoiding some of the costs 
associated with its absolute form. 
I. THE NON-INTERFERENCE PRINCIPLE 
In theory, a number of IP and antitrust doctrines could lead 
to liability against defendants based on the design of their 
products or services, even when they have not directly infringed or 
engaged in acts that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws.11 
In practice, however, what I call the “non-interference principle” 
limits these doctrines’ applicability in cases involving pure 
product design. This “principle” is not so much a defined, 
recognized doctrine as an implicit presumption against judicial 
interference with product design or private business decisions, 
except in unusual circumstances. It plays out somewhat 
differently in IP and antitrust law, but in both contexts, it reflects 
an intuition that judicial meddling can do more harm than good. 
This Part briefly introduces the principle and its core rationales. 
Part II considers in more detail its application in IP and antitrust, 
respectively. 
Of course, the law interferes with business decisions all the 
time. From environmental protection to consumer safety 
regulations to labeling requirements to labor laws, the 
government has substantial influence over the design, 
manufacture, and sale of products and services. At least in theory, 
however, these laws typically provide notice of the nature and 
scope of the obligations they impose.12 The type of judicial 
“interference” explored in this essay is different in three 
significant ways. First, it involves products or services that do not 
 
 11. Products directly infringing on a patent, trademark, or copyright will routinely 
result in liability, unless some defense applies; the products discussed here do not 
infringe directly but play some role in facilitating an act of infringement. 
 12. E.g., Emission Standards Reference Guide for On-road and Nonroad Vehicles 
and Engines, EPA, (last updated Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/emission-
standards-reference-guide (providing detailed lists of emissions standards for various 
sizes and classes of vehicle).  
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directly violate any law or regulation; they are problematic, if at 
all, because of their anticompetitive effects or their use in another 
party’s infringement. Second, and relatedly, both the facts and the 
governing legal standards in these cases are often murky, making 
it hard to assess whether a given product or service will (or 
should) pass muster under existing rules. And finally, IP and 
antitrust law tend to involve innovative industries with fast-
moving and cumulative product designs. As a result, injunctions 
in these cases can cut off unknown paths of future innovation. 
Each of these features helps to explain why both IP and 
antitrust law have some version of a non-interference rule. While 
courts and commentators offer a variety of rationales for the 
principle, most of them relate to one of three themes: the error 
costs, the supervision costs, and the risk of chilling innovation and 
interfering with legitimate trade. 
 Error Costs A.
Perhaps the primary driver of the non-interference principle 
is the worry about judicial error in these complex and 
indeterminate cases. “Error” need not come in the form of a legal 
misstep or a mistaken reading of the factual record; more often, it 
results from inadequate information about the inputs to a liability 
decision. Take, for example, an antitrust claim based on a 
monopolist’s product change whose primary purpose was 
(allegedly) to block entry by competitors, rather than to improve 
the product. As Richard Gilbert points out, “[i]n an ideal, and 
entirely abstract, world,” such a claim “should be evaluated based 
on its expected consumer welfare effects”—i.e., on the balance 
between anticompetitive harms and consumer benefits from the 
product change.13 In the real world, however, measuring such 
effects proves daunting. Gilbert and other commentators 
emphasize the particular challenge of “determin[ing] the value of 
[the monopolist’s] innovation, particularly over the longer term, 
including any spillover benefits for other technologies.”14 If a court 
gets it wrong and blocks a new product innovation, in other words, 
the decision could deprive the public not only of that innovation, 
but of an unknown stream of products that might have built upon 
it.15 
 
 13. Richard J. Gilbert, Not Another Drug! Antitrust for Drug and Other 
Innovations, 30 ANTITRUST 38, 41 (Fall 2015). 
 14. Id.; see also Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, supra note 10, at 36–37 
(“Calculating the aggregate future value of an invention, discounted to present value, 
poses an intractable challenge, not least because it is often difficult to predict the 
future significance of a particular contribution to the relevant art.”); see generally 
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 
(2004) (“The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 
liability.”).  
 15. Cf. William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in High-Tech Industries: Improving the 
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Similar measurement challenges plague IP suits involving 
infringement-facilitating technologies. How, for example, does one 
determine whether the long-term social benefits of a new 
infringement-enabling technology outweigh the costs that it 
imposes through facilitating infringement?16 The question 
becomes especially thorny since social costs may not correlate 
perfectly with the individual costs incurred by rights-holders. 
Copyright and patent infringement, for example, arguably harm 
society only if they impair incentives of future creators,17 and the 
welfare effects of trademark infringement can be ambiguous.18 As 
a result, balancing the costs and benefits of an injunction against 
infringement-enabling technologies can be daunting. 
Error costs, of course, can run in both directions, so an error 
cost analysis should take both false positives (Type I errors) and 
false negatives (Type II errors) into account.19 In both IP and 
antitrust, the non-interference principle responds primarily to the 
risk of Type I errors, based on a presumption that their associated 
harms are harder to anticipate and measure.20 This essay 
addresses the presumption and its implications below. For now, 
the important point is that concern about error costs provides 
much of the impetus for the non-interference rule. 
 Supervision Costs  B.
Compounding the worry over error costs is a reluctance to 
 
Federal Antitrust Joint Venture, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1097, 1101 (2012) (noting 
concerns “that the antitrust system has (1) a limited capacity to interpret how 
innovation has shaped the industry status quo and (2) an even weaker ability to make 
accurate forecasts about the path and commercial significance of innovation in the 
future”). 
 16. Compare, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 942–49 
(2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (liability against intermediary is appropriate if the 
number of non-infringing uses of its technology is “dwarfed by” the “overwhelming” 
volume of infringement), with id. at 949–66 (Breyer, J., concurring) (concluding that, 
on balance, the threat to innovation from an injunction outweighs harms to copyright 
holders from file sharing, making liability based on technology design inappropriate). 
 17. Id. at 949–66 (Breyer, J., concurring); Reese, supra note 10, at 891 (2005) 
(“Courts evaluating dual-use technology cases seem likely to take a relatively formal 
view that sees all infringing acts enabled by the technology as a cost, and, 
consequently, may be likely to restrict technologies more often than would be 
desirable”). 
 18. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010).  
 19. The anticompetitive harms resulting from product changes, for example—
including any spillovers that may result from excluded competitors’ products—may be 
equally hard to measure. See infra note 26 and accompanying text; see generally Philip 
J. Weiser, Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T, Microsoft, and Beyond, 76 
ANTITRUST L.J. 271 (2009) (noting the need to consider social benefits of technologies 
that monopolist’s behavior may have foreclosed); Franklin M. Fisher, Antitrust and 
Innovative Industries, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 559 (2000) (“[E]xempting a particular 
innovative firm from the application of antitrust may have a deleterious effect on the 
rate or nature of innovation in the industry as a whole.”). 
 20. See Gilbert, supra note 13, at 41; Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 10, at 24–42.  
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embroil agencies and judges in defining and supervising the 
details of product design.21 This concern is related to error costs, 
in that lack of confidence about the line between lawful and 
unlawful behavior compounds the challenge of crafting 
appropriate relief. But it also has broader social and institutional 
dimensions. In this view, courts are poorly suited for the task of 
curating technological progress, and in light of the resources 
necessary to shape appropriate remedies, the quest is not worth 
the candle.22 As Diane Leenheer Zimmerman has argued in the 
copyright context, “[i]f the Court were to require dual use 
technologies to be modified to eliminate or reduce infringement, it 
might open a veritable Pandora’s box of questions about 
feasibility, design, and negative effects.”23 Phillip Areeda made 
the same point about antitrust, warning against injunctions that 
require courts “to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of 
a regulatory agency.”24 The worry over judicial supervision 
depends on the nature of the violation and alternatives available 
to the problematic product, feature, or behavior. As a general rule, 
however, an aversion to indefinite judicial oversight, and to miring 
courts in the weeds of complex technologies, plays an important 
role in the reluctance to second-guess design choices.  
 Chilling Effect and Interference with Legitimate Trade  C.
The final theme underlying the non-interference principle is a 
cluster of concerns about the effects of expansive IP and antitrust 
rules on technological innovation and legitimate conduct. To some 
extent, the innovation concern harkens back to error costs; if 
courts underestimate the positive spillover effects of a challenged 
technology, for example, they might wrongly condemn it, and 
society could lose the future benefits.25 But some courts and 
 
 21. See Weiser, supra note 19, at 292 (“Cautioning against the case for government 
oversight of the relations between platforms and applications is the difficulty of 
overseeing the terms of dealing in a technologically dynamic context.”). 
 22. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 
925 (2001) (“The real problem lies on the institutional side: the enforcement agencies 
and the courts do not have adequate technical resources, and do not move fast enough, 
to cope effectively with a very complex business sector that changes very rapidly. This 
problem will be extremely difficult to solve; indeed, I cannot even glimpse the 
solution.”). 
 23. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Daddy, Are We There Yet? Lost in Grokster-
Land, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y. 75, 92 (2005); see also Mark A. Lemley & R. 
Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting 
Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1384 (2004) (“A court that decides to stop infringing 
content while letting the rest of the service continue either will have to enjoin all 
infringing content in advance (in which case no rational defendant will operate their 
system at all, for fear of going to jail for contempt) or will be signing up to resolve an 
endless series of oversight disputes about particular cases.”). 
 24. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 
58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1989). 
 25. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 13, at 41 (“[I]n many situations the benefits from 
an innovation are uncertain. In those instances, the fact-finder should credit the 
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commentators go further, taking almost an absolutist view of the 
sanctity of innovation. In this view, the impossibility of measuring 
the value of any particular innovation—and the prospect that it 
might bring enormous future benefits—call for a powerful 
presumption in its favor. Indeed, as long as the innovation has 
some plausible pro-competitive (antitrust) or non-infringing (IP) 
aspect or use, this approach calls for non-interference. It does so, 
moreover, without regard to the magnitude of the costs on the 
other side.26 It is akin to balancing a roughly estimable set of 
harms against infinity: infinity will always win. 
Additionally, courts fret about the impact that liability could 
have on two sets of parties: those interested in lawful uses of the 
condemned technology,27 and unrelated actors whose legitimate 
business activities might be chilled because they fall too close to 
the fuzzy line between legal and illicit behavior.28 The first group 
includes, for example, people interested in using a product for a 
non-infringing purpose, despite the fact that most others use it to 
infringe. If a court grants an injunction against sale of the 
product, it will not only prevent the infringement, but will also cut 
off access to the lawful user. The second category consists of 
developers of similar products or services with designs or business 
models that resemble the defendant’s. Courts and commentators 
worry that without adequate notice of the line between legal and 
illegal conduct, many of these developers will walk away even if 
their venture has net social value.29 
 
innovation with an additional weight to reflect the likelihood that the fact-finder may 
underestimate its societal contribution.”). 
 26. See Hillary Greene, Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products, Innovation and 
Free Speech, 95 B.U.L. REV. 35, 39 (2015) (“The difficulties associated with making 
tradeoffs across incommensurate values have led [antitrust suits involving speech and 
innovation] toward de facto, and arguably flawed, polar treatment in which legal 
determinations depend on the existence, rather than the levels, of protected speech or 
nonpretextual innovation, respectively.”); cf. Frank Pasquale, Paradoxes of Digital 
Antitrust: Why the FTC Failed to Explain its Inaction on Search Bias, HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. (2013) (“When ‘new economy’ firms enter the mix, regulators are liable to throw 
up their hands in frustration, unwilling to even try to give a reliable, public estimate of 
the harms and benefits arising out of any particular transaction or practice.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 28. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 949–66 (2005) 
(contending that “[t]he additional risk and uncertainty” from balancing infringing 
against non-infringing uses in copyright law “would mean a consequent additional chill 
of technological development”). 
 29. See generally Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 
WIS. L. REV. 891 (2012) (describing effect of Napster decision on innovation in the 
music technology space); Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust Need to Be Modernized?, 21 
J. ECON. PERSP. 155, 159–60 (2007) (“[T]he cost of errors must include not only the cost 
of mistakes on the firms involved in a particular case, but also the effect of setting a 
legal precedent that will cause other firms to adjust their behavior inefficiently.”); cf. 
William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for 
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, COLUM. BUS. L. REV., 
2007, at 21 (noting the “wariness of rules that might discourage dominant firms” from 
“strategies that generally serve to improve consumer welfare” resulting from “the 
economic contributions of large firms and fear that overly restrictive rules will induce a 
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II. NON-INTERFERENCE IN PRACTICE 
In combination, concerns about error costs, supervision costs, 
and chill ordinarily persuade judges to stay out of decisions about 
technology design. In both IP and antitrust law, however, courts 
occasionally impose liability at least in part based on the design of 
a defendant’s products or services. Part II examines some of these 
cases to understand which values can override the non-
interference principle, and why. 
 Non-Interference and Intellectual Property Law A.
All of the core fields of IP have rules that allow people who do 
not directly infringe to face liability for infringement. Patent law 
reaches parties that induce infringement, as well as those who 
knowingly sell products specially designed to infringe.30 Copyright 
law has doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability, which 
apply to parties that knowingly enable infringement or profit from 
infringement that they could have controlled.31 And trademark 
law offers its own version of contributory liability, narrowed 
somewhat to reflect its distinct normative goals.32 All of these 
doctrines reflect the notion that, sometimes, a party’s relationship 
to someone else’s infringement makes it fair to hold that party 
legally responsible for any harm that ensues.33 Particularly when 
direct infringers are plentiful, far-flung, and hard to identify, 
secondary liability can satisfy rights-holders’ “legitimate demand 
for effective—not merely symbolic—protection” of their legal 
rights.34 
Each of these doctrines, moreover, can apply to parties that 
design their products and services in ways that enable 
 
harmful passivity”). 
 30. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012) (defining contributory infringement as the sale or 
import of “a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or 
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, 
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made 
or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article 
or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use”).  
 31. See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001).  
 32. Secondary liability in trademark requires either intentional inducement of 
direct infringement, or the supply of products “to identified individuals known by [the 
defendant] to be engaging in continuing infringement.” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984) (describing trademark law’s standard 
for contributory liability as “narrow” compared to copyright); see generally Inwood Labs 
v. Ives Labs, 456 U.S. 844, 854–55 (1982) (limiting contributory trademark 
infringement to a “manufacturer or distributor [who] intentionally induces another to 
infringe a trademark, or . . . continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or 
has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement”). 
 33. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 (“For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all 
areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the 
broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one 
individual accountable for the actions of another.”). 
 34. Id. at 442. 
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infringement. Take patent law’s contributory infringement rule, 
which began as a common-law doctrine and now appears in 
section 271(c) of the Patent Act.35 Under this doctrine, a party that 
knowingly sells a product specifically suited for infringement can 
face liability, just as if it had infringed directly. The early case law 
reflected a number of interrelated reasons for the cause of action. 
From an enforcement perspective, it enabled infringers to sue a 
single party rather than many, when that single party was 
enabling myriad disparate acts of infringement.36 Relatedly, it 
reduced the incentive for firms to game the patent system and sell 
products that did everything short of infringing.37 Finally, from an 
equitable standpoint, courts had little trouble imposing liability 
against parties whose illicit intentions were clear, and who had no 
real justification for their actions.38 Indeed, courts often explain 
contributory infringement as a means of ferreting out parties with 
infringing intent. If a product has no real purpose other than 
infringement, they reason, then its seller “will be presumed to 
intend the natural consequences of his act; he will be presumed to 
 
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). The doctrine experienced a tumultuous path to codification, 
as explained by the Supreme Court in Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 
U.S. 176, 187–200 (1980). 
 36. See Odin B. Roberts, Contributory Infringement of Patent Rights, 12 HARV. L. 
REV. 35, 39–40 (1898) (“A manufacturer who distributes thousands of infringing 
machines is the only defendant against whom the patentee can obtain real relief; for as 
against the purchaser and user a suit in equity could not reimburse the patentee for 
the unavoidable expenses of his suit; the courts recognize the existence of this state of 
things, and in cases of contributory infringement assist the patentee, so far as possible 
and proper, in his attempt to stop the trespass at its origin rather than compel him to 
take a course which practically opposes an impossibility to his effort toward 
establishing or enforcing his right.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (“It cannot 
be, that, where a useful machine is patented as a combination of parts, two or more can 
engage in its construction and sale, and protect themselves by showing, that, though 
united in an effort to produce the same machine, and sell it, and bring it into extensive 
use, each makes and sells one part only, which is useless without the others, and still 
another person, in precise conformity with the purpose in view, puts them together for 
use.”); see also Dawson, 448 U.S. at 188 (noting that contributory infringement doctrine 
“is of particular importance in situations . . . where enforcement against direct 
infringers would be difficult, and where the technicalities of patent law make it 
relatively easy to profit from another’s invention without risking a charge of direct 
infringement”). 
 38. See Am. Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89, 94–95 (1882) (finding 
contributory liability when defendant sold components with the “intent” of enabling 
infringement: “he is so liable only as he is regarded as doing what he does with the 
purpose” of facilitating infringement); see also Dawson, 448 U.S. at 188 (noting that 
doctrine “exists to protect patent rights from subversion by those who, without directly 
infringing the patent themselves, engage in acts designed to facilitate infringement by 
others”); see also MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932 (2005) (“The 
doctrine was devised to identify instances in which it may be presumed from 
distribution of an article in commerce that the distributor intended the article to be 
used to infringe another’s patent, and so may justly be held liable for that 
infringement . . . In sum, where an article is ‘good for nothing else’ but infringement . . . 
there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no 
injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe.” (quoting Canda v. Mich. 
Malleable Iron Co., 124 F. 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1903)).  
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intend that they shall be used in the combination of the patent.”39 
At the same time, from the beginning,40 patent liability for 
such product sales has been limited to products that lack a 
substantial non-infringing use.41 Sellers of so-called “staple 
articles”—products with both infringing and non-infringing 
applications—cannot face liability for the mere sale of the product, 
despite their knowledge that some buyers may use it to infringe.42 
The staple-article doctrine “absolves the equivocal conduct of 
selling an item with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, 
and limits liability to instances of more acute fault than the mere 
understanding that some of one’s product will be misused.”43 It 
embodies the patent version of the non-interference principle, with 
its concerns about error costs, judicial meddling, and the need to 
protect legitimate commerce against interference by rights-
holders. These same concerns led the Supreme Court to extend the 
doctrine to copyright law in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc.44 
Sony involved claims against the manufacturer of the 
Betamax video recorder, based on the fact that some consumers 
were using it to infringe. The Court recognized that, just as in 
patent law, “adequate protection” of copyright interests “may 
require courts to look beyond actual duplication of a device or 
publication to the products or activities that make such 
duplication possible.”45 Overly-broad liability, however, could give 
rights-holders unwarranted power over technological innovation 
and lawful behavior. To avoid this result, the Court looked to the 
staple-article doctrine to “strike a balance between a copyright 
holder’s legitimate demand for effective—not merely symbolic—
protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others 
freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”46 
The Court offered scant details, however, on how courts 
 
 39. New York Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459 (8th Cir. 1915); see also 
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468–69 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 40. See generally Dawson, 448 U.S. at 187–202 (describing history of judicial and 
legislative treatment of contributory infringement and the staple article doctrine). 
 41. Before the 1952 Patent Act, courts used “contributory infringement” as a 
general term that encompassed both inducement and the sale of non-staple articles 
with knowledge that they would be used to infringe. In the 1952 Act, however, 
Congress divided the two causes of action into “inducement” and “contributory 
infringement.” See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2012) (inducement, contributory 
infringement). 
 42. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c); cf. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (related claim of inducement; “[e]specially where a product has 
substantial noninfringing uses, intent to induce infringement cannot be inferred even 
when the defendant has actual knowledge that some users of its product may be 
infringing the patent”). 
 43. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 932–33. 
 44. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 45. Id. at 442. 
 46. Id.; see also Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933 (2005) (noting that staple-article doctrine 
“leaves breathing room for innovation and a vigorous commerce”).  
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should go about striking that balance, while leaving tantalizing 
sound bites supporting a hardline hands-off-innovation 
approach.47 In particular, in one passage, the Court suggested 
that to benefit from the Sony safe harbor, a defendant’s product 
“need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”48 
Advocates for online intermediaries and technology developers 
have seized on this language to insist that any technology that has 
a conceivable non-infringing application deserves protection under 
Sony.49 Others—including myself—have argued that such a rigid 
approach ignores the Sony Court’s call for balance between the 
interests of incentive and innovation.50 Still others concur with the 
broad reading of Sony’s safe harbor as a descriptive matter but 
question the Supreme Court’s wisdom in weighing innovation 
interests so heavily against copyright concerns.51 
Despite decades of litigation and scholarly debate, we have no 
greater clarity now on the scope of Sony’s safe harbor than we had 
 
 47. See Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sony for Napster 
and other Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 959 (2001) (“As stated by the 
Court, the doctrine should limit copyright holders’ rights against equipment sellers 
when necessary to give consumers unimpeded access to markets ‘substantially 
unrelated’ to copyright infringement.”). 
 48. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
 49. See Brief of Professors Edward Lee, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, MGM Studios, Inc. et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 05-
1631), 2005 WL 508111; Brief of Amici Curiae Internet Law Faculty in Support of 
Respondents, MGM Studios, Inc. et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-
480), 2005 WL 508098; Brief, Grokster, of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of 
Respondents, MGM Studios, Inc. et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-
480), 2005 WL 508116; Brief of Sixty Intellectual Property and Technology Law 
Professors and the United States Policy Committee of the Association for Computing 
Machinery, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, MGM Studios, Inc. et al. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 508123. 
 50. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (noting the need for “a balance between a copyright 
holder’s legitimate demand for effective . . . protection . . . and the right of others freely 
to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”); see generally Dogan, supra 
note 49, at 939; Stacey L. Dogan, Infringement Once Removed: The Perils of 
Hyperlinking to Infringing Content, 87 IOWA L. REV. 829, 862–63 (2002); Metro-
Goldwyn-Meyer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, LTD. - Brief of Professors Peter S. Menell, 
David Nimmer, Robert P. Merges, and Justin Hughes, as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 511 (2005) (“Properly understood, . . . Sony 
permits imposition of liability for contributory infringement when the infringing uses 
of a defendant’s product are so central to the defendant’s business model that it is not 
genuinely engaged in an area of commerce ‘substantially unrelated’ to copyright 
infringement.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright 
Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 400–01 (2003) 
(“Full analysis requires that the benefits associated with legitimate use be weighed 
against the harms associated with illegitimate use. The Court failed to consider that 
balance. Instead, its ruling implies that VCR manufacturers can facilitate any 
copyright violation they wish so long as they can prove that VCRs also facilitate some 
non-trivial amount of legitimate behavior.”); Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry 
Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 424 (2002) (“The 
Sony test for contributory copyright infringement—whether the object in question is 
capable of substantial noninfringing uses—is far too weak and fails to take into 
account at all the scope of the infringing uses that will result. It is bad third-party 
copyright policy.”). 
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when a divided Court issued the opinion over 30 years ago. The 
lower courts have offered radically different views on the quantity 
of non-infringing use that can trigger the safe harbor, as well as 
the relevance of design options that could have reduced 
infringement.52 In its one recent attempt to broach the topic, the 
Supreme Court majority dodged the question, with concurrers 
divided evenly over both the meaning of Sony and the wisdom of a 
broadly protective safe harbor for technology.53 
Patent law—the source of the staple-article doctrine—offers 
little help in clarifying the doctrine’s applicability. The Supreme 
Court has never directly addressed the distinction between staple 
and non-staple goods in the patent context.54 The Federal Circuit 
has made an attempt, defining non-infringing uses as substantial 
“when they are not unusual, far-fetched, illusory, impractical, 
occasional, aberrant, or experimental.”55 Defendants thus cannot 
escape liability for selling infringement-enabling products merely 
by pointing to evidence that someone has used the product for 
non-infringing purposes; the fact finder should “consider not only 
the use’s frequency, but also the use’s practicality, the invention’s 
intended purpose, and the intended market.”56 But if the article 
has significant uses for purposes other than infringement, its 
seller cannot face liability as a contributory infringer based on the 
sale alone. As long as a product passes the “substantial non-
infringing use” threshold, the staple-article doctrine eschews 
detailed inquiry into the relative social costs and benefits of the 
product, or whether alternative designs might have shifted that 
balance. Both copyright and patent thus have a strong anti-
intervention rule for products whose non-infringing uses are 
“substantial”—but no clear guidance on what “substantial” means. 
 
 52. Compare MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 
2004) (“in order for limitations imposed by Sony to apply, a product need only be 
capable of substantial noninfringing uses”), with In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 
334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Even when there are non-infringing uses of a 
[product], moreover, if the infringing uses are substantial then to avoid liability as a 
contributory infringer the provider of the service must show that it would have been 
disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the 
infringing uses.”). 
 53. Compare MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 942–49 (2005) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (interpreting Sony to allow liability against parties whose 
products “were overwhelmingly used to infringe,” for which “infringement was the 
overwhelming source of revenue”), with id. at 953–54 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting 
Sony’s emphasis on future uses of technology to conclude that the safe harbor should 
apply to any technology with a “significant future market for noninfringing uses”). 
 54. The Court has discussed the staple-article doctrine, but never in close cases. 
See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 487–88 (1964) 
(“Indeed, this is the almost unique case in which the component was hardly suitable for 
any noninfringing use.”); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) 
(alleged infringer admitted that product was non-staple).  
 55. Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 56. I4I Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 851 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also 
Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 1963) (suggesting that non-
infringing use would not be substantial when it was “an afterthought”). 
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This lack of clarity about product-based contributory 
infringement has arguably endured, in part, because another 
doctrine—inducement—has offered an alternative path to liability 
in close cases. Even when a product qualifies as a “staple,” its 
special suitability for infringement may, along with other facts, 
support a finding of inducement under both patent and copyright 
law.57 Inducement thus allows courts to impugn perceived 
wrongdoers, without having to fix a clear line between “staple” 
and “non-staple” goods. 
Patent inducement, which appears in Section 271(b) of the 
Patent Act, applies when a party affirmatively intends to enable 
infringement, and makes statements or acts to promote it.58 An 
inducement claim “requires knowledge that the induced act 
constitutes patent infringement,” or willful blindness to the 
possibility; mere negligence or recklessness is not enough.59 The 
law is less clear on what kinds of statements or acts can qualify as 
“active[] induce[ment]” by parties demonstrating knowledge and 
intent.60 Of course, if the mere sale of a staple article could qualify 
as an inducing statement or act, Section 271(b) (inducement) 
would make Section 271(c) (contributory infringement) redundant; 
as a result, the sale of a staple article, alone, cannot support an 
inducement claim.61 But the case law varies on what more a 
plaintiff must prove. While some courts require affirmative steps 
to instruct, direct, or facilitate the infringement,62 others appear 
to dispense with that requirement when the evidence of intent is 
compelling. Indeed, a handful of courts have suggested that 
designing and selling a staple article can satisfy the “inducing 
acts” requirement when accompanied by persuasive evidence that 
the defendant specifically intended the article to be used to 
 
 57. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent 
shall be liable as an infringer.”); see also DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS 
§ 17.04 (revised ed. 1997) (noting that a person induces “by actively and knowingly 
aiding and abetting another’s direct infringement of the patent”); Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l 
Trade Com’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[I]nducement, like contributory 
infringement, is commonly based on the provision of articles.”). 
 58. Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Comput. Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“Unlike contributory infringement, induced infringement liability . . . requires proof 
that the inducer [has] an affirmative intent to cause direct infringement.”). 
 59. Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 765–771 (2011). 
 60. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). 
 61. See AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 1059–60 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Especially 
where a product has substantial noninfringing uses, intent to induce infringement 
cannot be inferred even when the defendant has actual knowledge that some users of 
its product may be infringing the patent.”); see generally Mark A. Lemley, Inducing 
Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 232 (2005) (“To hold that the sale of a 
component without more constitutes inducement would permit section 271(b) to 
swallow section 271(c), rendering moot the limitations of the latter section.”).  
 62. E.g., Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1125–26 (W.D. 
Wis. 2007) (rejecting claim of inducement when defendant “may have known that its 
customers would perform the patented methods,” but did not “encourage[] infringement 
by its customers”). 
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infringe.63 The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in MGM v. 
Grokster, moreover, has nudged the law further in that direction 
for both copyright and patent.64 
Grokster involved a claim of contributory copyright 
infringement against several defendants whose file-sharing 
software enabled widespread infringement of copyrighted content, 
especially music and movies.65 Although Grokster itself raised only 
copyright issues, the opinion drew upon—and in turn influenced—
contributory infringement and inducement in patent law.66 The 
Ninth Circuit had ruled for the Grokster defendants, on the 
ground that their file-sharing software had substantial non-
infringing uses and thus fell within the Sony safe harbor.67 When 
the Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Grokster, most observers 
expected it to address whether a product chiefly used to infringe 
could qualify for protection under Sony.68 Instead, the Court 
turned to inducement doctrine, reasoning that defendants who 
induce infringement are liable without regard to their products’ 
potential non-infringing uses.69 Because the record supported a 
finding of inducement, the Court saw no need to clarify the 
contours of Sony. Like Sony itself, however,70 Grokster leaves 
ample uncertainty, this time about exactly what it takes to induce. 
In places, the Grokster majority describes inducement with 
action verbs, suggesting that inducers must take concrete, 
intentional steps to promote acts of infringement. The Court 
begins, for example, by noting that “where evidence goes beyond a 
product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to 
infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to 
promoting infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not 
 
 63. See, e.g., Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Acer Amer. Corp., 655 F. Supp. 2d 650, 658 
(E.D. Tex. 2009) (“Aiding and abetting . . . includes selling infringing products for 
resale to consumers,” with the intent to cause direct infringement); Oak Indus. v. 
Zenith Elecs. Corp., 726 F. Supp. 1525, 1542–43 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“[T]he important 
inquiry is whether Zenith possessed the requisite intent to be held liable for inducing 
infringement.”); id. at 1542–43 (“We think that plaintiffs may prove Zenith’s intent to 
induce infringement by showing a number of actions from which the trier of fact could 
infer such intent,” including “giving a direct infringer instructions on how to use a 
patented process or designing a product to infringe.”) (emphasis added). 
 64. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 933–37; see also Ricoh Co. Ltd. v. Quanta Comput. Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 
1336–43 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (relying on Grokster in patent inducement case). 
 67. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154, 1160–62 (9th Cir. 2004); see generally Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 68. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann, Peer-to-Peer Technology as Infrastructure: An 
Economic Argument for Retaining Sony’s Safe Harbor for Technologies Capable of 
Substantial Noninfringing Uses, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 329, 331 (2005) (“In Sony, the 
Supreme Court established a safe harbor from secondary liability when a technology is 
‘capable of substantial non-infringing uses,’ and in Grokster, the Supreme Court will 
decide whether such capacity will remain sufficient to trigger the safe harbor.”). 
 69. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37. 
 70. See generally Dogan, supra note 49, at 953 n.82 (noting “wide assortment” of 
plausible interpretations of Sony’s staple article of commerce doctrine). 
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preclude liability.”71 This view of inducement as active 
encouragement recurs several times in the opinion,72 and 
commentators have seized upon it as evidence that inducement 
requires some act beyond the mere sale of an infringement-
enabling product.73 
When read as a whole, however, the Grokster opinion reveals 
a very different view of the relationship between acts and intent in 
evaluating claims of inducement. Despite its reference to 
“statements or actions,” the Court’s core focus lies squarely on 
what it perceives as the central question in inducement analysis: 
the defendant’s intent to enable infringement.74 The Court seems 
to view infringement-promoting acts not as a separate 
requirement for inducement, but as one way to demonstrate that 
the defendant acted with illicit purpose.75 In this view, the 
inducement inquiry is a quest for culpability, a tool to distinguish 
between parties based on the legitimacy of their underlying 
motives. 
The emphasis on intent begins with the Court’s recasting of 
Sony—and the staple article of commerce doctrine more 
generally—as all “about liability resting on imputed intent.”76 
According to Justice Souter, the staple-article doctrine “was 
devised to identify instances in which it may be presumed from 
distribution of an article that the distributor intended the article 
to be used to infringe another’s patent, and so may justly be held 
liable for that infringement.”77 It logically follows from this 
characterization, of course, that when there’s actual evidence of a 
distributor’s infringing intent, liability may be appropriate, even if 
her device has non-infringing uses: the illegitimate intention 
combines with the act of distribution to make the distributor 
 
 71. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 935 (emphasis added). 
 72. See, e.g., id. (suggesting that liability is appropriate “where evidence goes 
beyond a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing 
uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement”); id. 
(listing, as examples of inducing acts, the advertisement of infringing uses, providing 
instructions or demonstrations, and other “‘active steps . . . taken to encourage direct 
infringement’”) (quoting Oak Industries, Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 
992 (N.D. Ill. 1988)). 
 73. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Three Reactions to MGM v. Grokster, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 177, 182–83 (2006) (suggesting that, given its reliance on 
patent law, Grokster’s inducement rule must “require[] proof of overt acts of 
inducement, such as advertising that actively promotes infringing uses or instruction 
manuals that show users how to infringe, as well as proof of a specific intent to induce 
infringement”); cf. Lemley, supra note 61, at 234 (noting “the Grokster Court’s new test 
for inducement in copyright law is unclear”). 
 74. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 935. 
 75. See Lemley, supra note 61, at 234 (“The Court seems at various points to have 
believed that it is only the defendant’s purpose that matters and that evidence of 
advertisements and other conduct are merely evidence that can be used to show that 
purpose.”). 
 76. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934. 
 77. Id. at 932 (emphasis added). 
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culpable and the liability “just.” And the Court hints at this, 
contrasting “the equivocal conduct of selling an item with 
substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses” with “instances of 
more acute fault than the mere understanding that some of one’s 
products will be misused.”78 If the “misuse” is intended rather 
than merely anticipated, suggests the Court, the staple-article 
doctrine is inapplicable.79 In this reading of Grokster, acts or 
communications promoting infringement are relevant not in their 
own right, but as evidence of the defendant’s unlawful purpose—
and are therefore not essential to liability, if that purpose reveals 
itself in other ways.80 Toward the end of its opinion, the Court 
confirms this point, describing three requirements for inducement: 
“intent to bring about infringement,” “distribution of a device 
suitable for infringing use,” and “evidence of actual infringement 
by recipients of the device.”81 
The focus on intent, moreover, makes fair game out of two 
considerations that appeared off limits after Sony: the role of 
infringement in defendant’s profit model, and the details of its 
product design. In Sony, having concluded that the relevant 
technology had substantial non-infringing uses, the Court ended 
its inquiry; it did not consider whether the defendant had chosen 
its business model with an eye toward infringement or whether 
design tweaks could have reduced or eliminated the product’s 
misuse. In Grokster, in contrast, the Court considered both of 
these questions as probative of intent. More specifically, it found 
“[t]hree features” of intent-related evidence as “particularly 
notable:”82 the defendants’ efforts to target former Napster users; 
their failure to “attemp[t] to develop filtering tools or other 
mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity using their 
software;” and the fact that their business model depended on 
 
 78. Id. at 932–33 (emphasis added). 
 79. See id. at 941 (finding facts to support inducement when “evidence of the 
distributors’ words and deeds [goes] beyond distribution [and] as such shows a purpose 
to cause and profit from third-party acts of copyright infringement.”). 
 80. Re-reading Grokster through an intent-focused lens supports this 
interpretation: almost every time the Court discusses acts of inducement, it treats 
them as evidence of intent. See, e.g., id. at 934 (“nothing in Sony requires courts to 
ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to 
foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law); id. at 935 (“The 
classic case of direct evidence of unlawful purpose occurs when one induces commission 
of infringement by another, or ‘entic[es] or persuad[es] another’ to infringe. . . as by 
advertising.”) (emphasis added); id. at 936 (noting that evidence of “active steps” to 
encourage infringement “show an affirmative intent that the product be used to 
infringe”); id. at 937 (“[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its 
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps to 
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”); 
id. at 938 (“The function of the message in the theory of inducement is to prove by a 
defendant’s own statements that his unlawful purpose disqualifies him from claiming 
protection.”) 
 81. Id. at 940. 
 82. Id. at 939. 
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“high-volume use, which the record shows is infringing.”83 While 
the Court cautioned that neither of the latter two points, alone, 
could justify a finding of inducement,84 it nonetheless included 
them in the mix. Grokster thus chipped away at the non-
interference principle in copyright and, by extension, patent law, 
finding it appropriate for courts to question both business model 
and design choices to the extent that they reflect on intent.85 In 
the wake of Grokster, lower courts in both copyright and patent 
cases have followed the Supreme Court’s lead, inquiring into 
commercial motivations and design alternatives in evaluating 
defendants’ intent, and thus their liability.86 
Although inducement liability provides a welcome middle 
ground as we await resolution of the meaning and fate of Sony,87 
its focus on intent fits somewhat awkwardly with the normative 
concerns reflected in the Sony doctrine and the non-interference 
principle more generally. The Sony Court was interested not in 
catching ill-intentioned culprits, but in finding the right balance 
between technological innovation and IP incentives. Its stated 
purpose, in other words, was utilitarian and outcome-based, 
rather than rooted in abstract notions of fairness or culpability. 
More generally, the rationale for keeping judges out of product 
design and business decisions has an eye toward error costs and 
outcomes, rather than smoking out people with illicit intent. 
Indeed, in antitrust law, courts and scholars warn of the dangers 
of basing liability decisions on intent rather than competitive 
effect.88 If error costs and uncertainty are substantial concerns, we 
 
 83. Id. at 939–40 (“Since the extent of the software’s use determines the gain to 
the distributors, the commercial sense of their enterprise turns on high-volume use, 
which the record shows is infringing.”). 
 84. Id. at 939 n.12 (“Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court 
would be unable to find contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to 
take affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses. Such a holding would tread too close to the Sony safe 
harbor.”); id. at 939 (noting that evidence of profit model “alone would not justify an 
inference of unlawful intent, but viewed in the context of the entire record its import is 
clear”). 
 85. See Stacey L. Dogan, “We Know it When We See It”: Intermediary Trademark 
Liability and the Internet, 7 STAN. TECH. L.J. 1, 6 n.9 (2011). 
 86. E.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1033–36 (9th Cir. 
2013); China Cent. Television v. Create New Tech. (HK) Ltd., No. CV 15–01869 MMM 
MRWX, 2015 WL 3649187, at *10 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2015) (finding intent and thus 
inducement, when the defendant “has not developed filtering tools, and the success of 
its business model depends on customers paying a one-time fee for unlimited access to 
infringing programming”); Arista Recs. LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 
153 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding the defendant’s “failure to exercise their clear ability to 
filter and limit infringement under such circumstances is strong circumstantial 
evidence of their intent to foster copyright infringement by their users”); Ricoh Co. v. 
Quanta Comput. Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“QSI’s role as the designer 
and manufacturer of the optical drives in question may evidence an intent sufficiently 
specific to support a finding of inducement.”). 
 87. Dogan, supra note 85, at 34–35 (commending the Grokster Court’s restoration 
of balance in secondary infringement inquiries). 
 88. See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9. 
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might have the same worry about IP law: even parties motivated 
to enable infringement might happen upon a technology that has 
great social value. 
Despite its imperfect match with Sony’s normative 
aspirations, however, Grokster may achieve indirectly what the 
Supreme Court could not settle on explicitly: a rough balance 
between legitimate commerce and ventures that do more harm 
than good. In this view, intent is relevant, not for its own sake, 
but for what it says about the likely nature and effect of the 
product or service at issue. In effect, intent serves as a proxy for 
evaluating whether a defendant’s venture would have existed in 
the absence of infringement, which I have suggested elsewhere as 
the appropriate inquiry in these mixed-use cases.89 It enables 
courts to decide whether intervention would interfere with 
legitimate trade. By viewing intent from this perspective, 
moreover, courts create an incentive for parties of ambiguous 
motives to take reasonable steps—if they’re available—to reduce 
the risk of infringement. For intent to serve this role, it should 
reflect not the subjective wishes of an individual, but the apparent 
purpose for which the product or service at issue was created and 
designed. Courts can evaluate this question through the kind of 
objective evidence that the Court considered in Grokster: design 
choices, customer base, and the business model’s dependence on 
infringement. 
The focus on intermediaries’ purpose and intent is not limited 
to patent and copyright law. I have argued elsewhere that 
trademark law is following a similar path, basing liability on 
implicit subjective judgments about the essential legitimacy of the 
defendant’s business model.90 
One of the virtues of this approach is that it gives the courts a 
window into product design, without requiring them to assess 
complex, indeterminate questions such as the future value of an 
innovation, or whether a defendant chose the optimal combination 
of features. It offers a broad zone of reasonableness for parties 
whose product or business model aims to meet a lawful demand, 
even if it also enables infringement.91 As such, it avoids some of 
the pitfalls that the non-interference principle was designed to 
address. But it does so in a focused way, preventing interference 
with legitimate behavior, rather than protecting technology at all 
 
 89. See generally Dogan, supra note 47. 
 90. Dogan, supra note 85, at 3 (“In the end, what matters most in these cases is 
whether the court believes in the defendant’s essential legitimacy and good faith.”). 
 91. Courts have, for example, refused to find intent to induce infringement, 
despite a generic pharmaceutical firm’s knowledge that some doctors will prescribe a 
drug for uses that will infringe a patent. E.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 
316 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[I]f a physician, without inducement by Apotex, 
prescribes a use of [the product] in an infringing manner, Apotex’s knowledge is legally 
irrelevant.”).  
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cost. 
 Non-Interference in Antitrust Law B.
 Antitrust’s version of the non-interference principle arises in 
cases involving product changes by monopolists that foreclose 
competitors from either entering a market or competing effectively 
in it. Generally, the plaintiffs in these cases contend that the 
modification’s exclusionary effects outweigh any product 
improvements or other procompetitive consequences that it might 
have, and constitute monopolization, attempted monopolization, 
or an illegal tie. In the Microsoft litigation of the 1990s, for 
example, the Justice Department claimed that Microsoft 
unlawfully bundled its Internet browser into its operating system 
to repress Netscape’s Navigator, which Microsoft feared could 
threaten its dominance in the operating system market.92 
Bundling also played a role in the IBM Plug-Compatibles 
Litigation, which challenged IBM’s decision to integrate disks and 
other hardware components into its computer products.93 In 
Berkey Photo, the plaintiff alleged that Kodak acted 
anticompetitively by introducing a new film and camera 
combination that was incompatible with Berkey’s film products.94 
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc. involved the redesign of a 
biopsy gun with the alleged goal of destroying its compatibility 
with competitors’ needles.95 In Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. 
v. Tyco Health Care Group, the plaintiff sued over the integration 
of sensors into a monitor, which allegedly destroyed the existing 
market for standalone, compatible sensors.96 The FTC 
investigated Intel for changing its compilers to work more slowly 
with non-Intel central processing units.97 The same agency’s 
investigation of Google focused on concerns that the search giant 
changed its search algorithm to snuff out competition from rivals 
engaged in more specialized, “vertical” search.98 And the “product-
 
 92. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 938–41 (D.C. Cir. 1998); 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting the 
government’s contention that “Microsoft’s efforts to gain market share in one market 
(browsers) served to meet the threat to Microsoft’s monopoly in another market 
(operating systems) by keeping rival browsers from gaining the critical mass of users 
necessary to attract developer attention away from Windows as the platform for 
software development”).  
 93. Several different plaintiffs asserted claims against IBM in connection with its 
product changes. See, e.g., In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. 
Supp. 965, 971 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Cal. Comput. Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 
744 (9th Cir. 1979); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 426 
(N.D. Cal. 1978). 
 94. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 267–68 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 95. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 96. Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 
993–94 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 97. Complaint of Petitioner at 2–5, Intel Corp., No. 9341 (FTC Dec. 16, 2009).  
 98. See Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search 
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hopping” lawsuits allege competitive harm from pharmaceutical 
firms’ decision to change formulations and pull existing products 
from the market on the eve of patent expiration, with the goal of 
frustrating generic competition.99 
Similar to contributory infringement or inducement claims in 
IP law, these antitrust claims raise concerns about the law’s 
interference with product innovation and legitimate trade. If a 
design change simultaneously improves the product and destroys 
interoperability with a competitor’s complementary good, how 
should a court assess the overall impact of the change? What if the 
manufacturer could have achieved the product improvements 
without destroying interoperability? 
In addition to the concerns underlying the non-interference 
rule more generally, antitrust law faces the added complication 
that its raison d’etre is promoting vigorous, and often destructive, 
competition in markets. Product experimentation and innovation 
lie at the heart of its competition-oriented goals. From the 
perspective of antitrust, firms should be competing aggressively 
and aiming for market leadership; the law should hardly condemn 
them when they succeed.100 
At the same time, both economic theory and antitrust law 
distinguish between market success that results from product 
enhancements and improved consumer welfare, on the one hand, 
and dominance that comes from exclusionary behavior, on the 
other. While experts disagree about the frequency, durability, and 
costs of monopolization, there is widespread agreement that acts 
 
Practices, FTC File No. 111–0163, p. 1 (Jan. 3, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/295971/130103googlesea
rchstmtofcomm.pdf (addressing the closure of the FTC’s “investigation relating to 
allegations that Google unfairly preferences its own content on the Google search 
results page and selectively demotes its competitors’ content from those results.”). 
 99. E.g., Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 418 (D. Del. 
2006); see also In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) Antitrust 
Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 674–77 (E.D. Pa. 2014); see generally Stacey L. Dogan & 
Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 687 
(2009); Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016). 
 100. See Posner, supra note 23 at 929 (“The more protection from competition the 
firm that succeeds in obtaining a monopoly will enjoy, the more competition there will 
be to become that monopolist; and provided that the only feasible or permitted means 
of obtaining the monopoly are socially productive, this competition may be wholly 
desirable.”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“In a 
competitive market, firms routinely innovate in the hope of appealing to consumers, 
sometimes in the process making their products incompatible with those of rivals; the 
imposition of liability when a monopolist does the same thing will inevitably deter a 
certain amount of innovation.”); see generally Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter 
vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575 (2007); cf. JOSEPH 
A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82–85 (3d ed. 1950) (noting 
the “perennial gale of creative destruction” that drives economic growth); F.M. 
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 407 (2d ed. 
1980) (“Making the best use of resources at any moment in time is important. But in 
the long run, it is dynamic performance that counts.”). 
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whose sole purpose is exclusionary should be condemned.101 
As in IP, then, courts and commentators agree about the 
extremes. Product changes that benefit consumers are lawful, 
without regard to incidental anticompetitive effects. At the other 
end, product changes that have no apparent purpose except to 
exclude competitors violate the antitrust laws. Just as in IP, the 
challenge comes in the middle, with design changes that have 
mixed effect.102 Like the defendants in IP suits, the monopolists in 
these cases protest against judicial interference with product 
design, claiming that Type I errors could block innovations of 
unknown future value.103 Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend 
that undue deference toward monopolists’ design choices would 
allow them to veil anticompetitive behavior behind negligible 
product “improvements.”104 The doctrinal story uncannily 
resembles its IP analog: despite decades of litigation and scholarly 
debate, courts have yet to settle on a consistent approach for 
balancing these concerns in antitrust cases. Instead, judges and 
commentators have sampled a variety of approaches on the 
spectrum between complete non-interference and full-fledged 
balancing. 
Despite their ultimate divergence, these approaches all begin 
with a presumption of non-interference. Even courts that find 
liability step gingerly around questions about design. As the D.C. 
Circuit noted in the Microsoft antitrust litigation: 
As a general rule, courts are properly very skeptical 
about claims that competition has been harmed by a 
dominant firm’s product design changes. In a competitive 
market, firms routinely innovate in the hope of appealing 
 
 101. E.g., Posner, supra note 100, at 929; Crane, supra note 6, at 3; Gilbert, supra 
note 13, at 5. 
 102. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58 (“Whether any particular act of a monopolist is 
exclusionary, rather than merely a form of vigorous competition, can be difficult to 
discern: the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are 
myriad. The challenge for an antitrust court lies in stating a general rule for 
distinguishing between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and competitive 
acts, which increase it.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant Microsoft Corp., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
235 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00–5212 & 00–5213), 2001 WL 34153358 (“The law 
is settled that design changes that improve a product cannot violate Section 2, 
regardless of the defendant’s intent. To hold otherwise would chill technological 
innovation.”) (citation omitted). 
 104. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees United States et al., United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00–5212 & 00–5213), 2001 WL 34129769 
(“Insulating design from antitrust scrutiny would encourage . . . predatory strategies 
and thus distort market-driven design and innovation.”); see generally Franklin M. 
Fisher, supra note 20, at 560 (warning that if courts held “that an innovation that 
brings any consumer benefits, no matter how small, should not be examined for 
anticompetitive effects, no matter how large[,] . . . [f]irms would have the incentive to 
cloak highly anti-competitive actions in the guise of a product-design choice that 
brought a small consumer benefit”).  
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to consumers, sometimes in the process making their 
products incompatible with those of rivals; the imposition 
of liability when a monopolist does the same things will 
inevitably deter a certain amount of innovation.105 
From this common starting point, however, the case law 
reveals subtle but significant differences in courts’ commitment to 
non-interference in relation to antitrust law’s other normative 
goals. Antitrust scholars, moreover, have added their own tweaks 
and suggestions. The result is a menu of options, but no definitive 
answer, to how antitrust law should treat design changes that 
offer some benefit but have demonstrable exclusionary effects. The 
options tend to fall into one of four overlapping categories: 
absolute non-interference, competitive-effects balancing, 
subjective intent, and the “no-economic sense” test. 
 
1. Absolute Non-Interference  
 
At one end of the spectrum, some courts and commentators 
suggest an absolute safe harbor for product changes that have 
plausible consumer benefits, regardless of their anticompetitive 
effects. In Allied Orthopedic v. Tyco,106 for example, defendant 
Tyco sold blood-oxygen monitors and compatible sensors. Around 
the time that its patents were set to expire, it introduced a new 
sensor-monitor combination that essentially destroyed the 
compatibility of sensors sold by competitors for use with the old 
monitors.107 It also stopped selling the old monitors. A group of 
customers sued, claiming (among other things) that the redesign 
had the purpose and effect of maintaining Tyco’s monopoly in the 
sensor market, which enabled it to charge monopoly prices. While 
acknowledging evidence that Tyco made the changes at least in 
part to exclude competitors, the court found that fact irrelevant 
because the new product reflected improvements over the prior 
design.108 When such improvements exist, the court held, the 
design change is immune from antitrust liability, regardless of 
whether the impact of the improvements is outweighed by their 
exclusionary effects: 
There is no room in this analysis for balancing the 
benefits or worth of a product improvement against its 
anticompetitive effects. If a monopolist’s design change is 
 
 105. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 65 (citation omitted). 
 106. Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
 107. The plaintiffs also objected to some of Tyco’s marketing agreements under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 996–98. This discussion focuses only on the Section 
2 monopolization claims, which related to Tyco’s product design. Id. at 998–1001. 
 108. Id. at 1001.  
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an improvement, it is “necessarily tolerated by the 
antitrust laws.” . . . To weigh the benefits of an improved 
product design against the resulting injuries to 
competitors is not just unwise, it is unadministrable. 
There are no criteria that courts can use to calculate the 
“right” amount of innovation, which would maximize 
social gains and minimize competitive injury.109 
The court’s aversion to balancing, in other words, reflects the 
same worry that motivated Justice Breyer’s concurrence in 
Grokster: that the inability to measure the future value of 
fledgling innovation makes it impossible to balance positive and 
negative effects with any accuracy.110 It also reflects a normative 
assumption that, in general, the future value of such innovation is 
likely to outweigh any harm that results from its infringing (IP) or 
exclusionary (antitrust) effects.111 This approach assumes, in 
other words, that Type 1 errors are likely to be more costly than 
Type 2 errors often enough, and by enough of a margin, to justify a 
rule that avoids them altogether. 
Like the strong view of the staple-article doctrine, absolute 
non-interference in antitrust has limits: a design change by a 
monopolist that brings no improvements and has exclusionary 
effects can justify liability, just as the sale of a non-staple 
constitutes contributory infringement.112 The same goes for 
designs whose pro-competitive effects are merely pretextual.113 
Finally, this approach calls for liability if the product change is 
paired with additional exclusionary acts, in the same way that IP 
allows liability for inducement.114 But just as some readers of 
 
 109. Id. at 1000. 
 110. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 958 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“Sony—by referring to a capacity for substantial noninfringing uses—
recognizes” that “a product’s market can evolve dramatically over time.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 111. Breyer directly addresses this point, concluding that the social costs of 
infringement on file-sharing networks are hypothetical and therefore do not make “a 
sufficiently strong case for change” to Sony’s strong presumption in favor of innovation. 
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 960. 
 112. This may have been the case in In re Intel, a suit filed by the FTC against Intel 
alleging that Intel modified its software compilers so that software generated by the 
compilers would work more slowly on machines with central processing units made by 
an Intel competitor. Complaint of Petitioner at 2–5, Intel Corp., No. 9341 (FTC Dec. 16, 
2009). As discussed below, Allied Orthopedic allows courts to consider intent in 
deciding whether a product has exclusively anticompetitive effects.  
 113. See generally Greene, supra note 26.  
 114. See Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 1000–02; see also Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 545–46 (9th Cir. 1983) (to violate Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, a “product introduction must be alleged to involve some associated 
conduct which constitutes an anticompetitive abuse or leverage of monopoly power, or a 
predatory or exclusionary means of attempting to monopolize the relevant market, 
rather than aggressive competition on the merits”). The Allied Orthopedic court 
acknowledged that such conduct may exist when the monopolist pulls an old product 
from the market and coerces consumers to buy its new one; such coercion, however, had 
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Sony view the “mere possibility” of commercially significant non-
infringing uses as sufficient to invoke its safe harbor, absolutists 
in antitrust view any product improvement, however small or 
unproven, as enough to absolve a monopolist from liability for its 
exclusionary effects. 
There is one more way in which absolute non-interference 
resembles the strongest view of Sony: it eschews inquiry into 
whether alternative designs or business strategies could have 
achieved the design’s benefits without its anticompetitive effects. 
At least on its face, the approach is all-or-nothing: either a product 
design has benefits to consumers, or it does not. If it has benefits, 
absolute non-interference calls for absolute immunity, even for 
designs with minor improvements and dramatic exclusionary 
effects.115 
 
2. Competitive-Effects Balancing 
 
At the other end of the spectrum from absolute non-
interference lies competitive-effects balancing, which calls on 
courts to balance a new design’s benefits against its exclusionary 
effects. Liability follows if the exclusionary effects dominate. As 
Hillary Greene points out, few courts have explicitly embraced 
this approach, and even fewer have gone ahead with all-out 
balancing.116 But a handful of courts—including the D.C. Circuit 
in Microsoft—have at least nominally adopted it.117 
The product-design claims in Microsoft118 involved the firm’s 
decision to bundle its Web browser into its operating system, and 
to eliminate the ability of original equipment manufacturers to 
replace it with a competitor such as Netscape’s Navigator.119 In 
particular, the firm not only integrated Explorer into Windows, 
but also excluded it from the “Add/Remove Programs utility” 
menu, and commingled the browser and operating system code, 
 
not occurred in Allied Orthopedic itself.  
 115. See also In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1144 
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Because iTunes 4.7 was a genuine improvement, the Court may not 
balance the benefits or worth of iTunes 4.7 against its anticompetitive effects.”); cf. 
Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013) (rejecting refusal-to-deal 
claims based on Microsoft’s decision to stop providing its application program 
interfaces to application developers because the move did not sacrifice short-term 
profits); see Greene, supra note 26, at 79 (“Either way, current precedent has effectively 
resulted in a polar outcome regarding the innovation and antitrust interface: the 
existence of a nonpretextual innovation justification is sufficient to overcome claimed 
anticompetitive effects.”).  
 116. Greene, supra note 26, at 76–77. 
 117. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
 118. Id. at 47. The case involved claims under both Section 1 and Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, alleging that a variety of agreements, policies and acts were designed to 
protect Microsoft’s monopoly in the market for Intel-based operating systems and/or to 
acquire a monopoly in the browser market. 
 119. Id. at 66. 
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which made removal of the operating system impracticable.120 
According to the findings of fact, Microsoft went through all this 
effort because it feared that a successful independent browser 
would supplant Windows as a platform for software applications, 
thus destroying Microsoft’s power in the operating system 
market.121 
Before addressing the government’s allegations of 
exclusionary behavior, the D.C. Circuit gave a roadmap for 
analyzing monopolization claims. First, as the party with the 
burden of proof, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
monopolist’s conduct harmed competition in the relevant 
market.122 Second, if the plaintiff has made such a showing, “the 
monopolist may proffer a ‘procompetitive justification’ for its 
conduct,”123 a “nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a 
form of competition on the merits because it involves, for example, 
greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal.”124 If the 
defendant does this, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, either 
to rebut the defendant’s justification or to demonstrate that the 
anticompetitive effect outweighs it. It is here that balancing comes 
into play: “[I]f the monopolist’s procompetitive justification stands 
unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive 
benefit.”125 The plaintiff must prove, in other words, that on 
balance, the conduct has primarily anticompetitive effect.126 
This is a dramatically different approach to non-interference 
than the Ninth Circuit’s in Allied Orthopedic.127 While the 
Microsoft court gives a nod to concerns about judicial meddling 
with innovation,128 it views those concerns as cautionary rather 
than immobilizing. At least in theory, the D.C. Circuit instructs 
courts to wrestle with the nature of design changes and to 
evaluate their net competitive effect. In this view, exclusionary 
 
 120. Id. at 64–65. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 58–59 (“[T]o be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must . . . 
harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers[;] . . . harm to one or more 
competitors will not suffice.”) (emphasis in original).  
 123. Id. at 59 (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., 504 U.S. 451, 483 
(1982)).  
 124. Id. (comparing Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 
Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. (likening the court’s burden-shifting approach to “rule of reason” analysis 
in cases arising under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and noting that the rule of reason 
originated in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), a 
monopolization case). 
 127. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
 128. Microsoft, 253 F.3d. at 65 (citing Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., 703 F.2d 534, 545–46 (9th Cir. 1983)) (“As a general rule, courts are properly very 
skeptical about claims that competition has been harmed by a dominant firm’s product 
design changes.”). 
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design choices can constitute monopolization, even if they also 
improve the product. 
Despite its broad pronouncements, however, the Microsoft 
court itself never gets into the weeds of competitive balancing. 
Instead, it considers three separate aspects of Microsoft’s design 
changes and finds no procompetitive justifications for two of 
them,129 and no evidence to rebut Microsoft’s justification for the 
third.130 As a result, the court can condemn the first two changes 
and bless the third, without ever balancing the virtues of product 
improvements against harms to competition. 
Even so, the Microsoft framework offers a real alternative to 
absolute non-interference and a different way of thinking about 
the implications of technological uncertainty. Rather than 
capitulating in the face of product improvements of unknown 
potential value, the balancing approach asks courts to do the hard 
job of unpacking the improvements and evaluating their overall 
purpose and effect. It shows confidence in courts’ ability to 
understand technology and, when appropriate, to disentangle 
various aspects of a product change. In Microsoft itself, for 
example, the defendant sought to focus attention on its design 
changes as a whole, characterizing the government’s claims as an 
attempt “to outlaw the design of Windows 98” with its integration 
of Explorer into Windows.131 The court, however, refused to treat 
browser integration as a single, black-box design decision; instead, 
it examined how Microsoft joined Explorer with Windows, and 
asked whether distinct design choices reflected exclusionary 
rather than product-improvement effects.132 Without saying so 
explicitly, the court thus acknowledged the relevance of design 
alternatives and the question of whether improvements could 
have been achieved through less restrictive means.133 
Admittedly, this kind of scrutiny and disaggregation of design 
 
 129. Id. (concluding that Microsoft failed to offer any valid business reason for 
commingling the browser/operating system code, and for removing Explorer from the 
“Add/Remove” utility).  
 130. Id. at 67 (finding precompetitive justifications for Microsoft’s decision to 
override user preferences and to make Explorer the default browser in certain 
circumstances, and concluding that the government failed to offer any evidence to 
rebut Microsoft’s showing). 
 131. Brief for Appellant Microsoft Corp. at 27, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 
F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00–5212 & 00–5213), 2001 WL 34153358. 
 132. See John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 681, 722 (2012) (“Unlike, for example, the Kodacolor II film under 
discussion in Berkey Photo, the code underlying Internet Explorer was capable of 
dissection into and analysis of separate functions, allowing the court more freedom to 
analyze anticompetitive aspects of its design.”). 
 133. Cf. C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 
COLUM. L. REV. 927, 943–44 (2016) (“Although cost-benefit comparisons often require 
courts to confront a tradeoff, this is not always the case. If one action, compared to 
another, has greater or equal benefit and also imposes a lesser burden on competition, 
it is decisively better. Such alternatives offer a free lunch that we may choose without 
regret.”). 
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decisions comes with costs and risks. An overly aggressive 
approach to design inquiries could trigger a lawsuit every time a 
monopolist changed its products, and could infect the innovation 
process with uncertainty and chill. Yet absolute non-interference 
has its own costs and risks, both in a static sense (by immunizing 
conduct with net social costs) and through its impact on incentives 
and norms. Just as a hardline hands-off-technology approach in IP 
law could disincentivize intermediaries from considering easy 
mechanisms to reduce infringement, so too could absolute non-
interference embolden monopolists to adopt trivial design changes 
whose primary purpose and effect are exclusionary.134 While 
technology absolutists may view this as the right result, from a 
social welfare perspective, it looks dubious. An ideal solution in 
both contexts would find some middle ground between full 
balancing and absolute non-interference—a compromise that 
insulates real technological progress without distorting incentives 
and frustrating IP and antitrust laws’ core goals. As discussed 
above, inducement—with its inquiry into the intent, purpose, and 
economic significance of product design—gives courts a proxy for 
such a compromise in IP law. Antitrust law has its own proxies 
that may serve a similar function in appropriate cases: the 
subjective intent and no-economic-sense tests. 
 
3. Subjective Intent  
 
Antitrust authorities generally agree that a monopolist’s 
intent, alone, cannot justify liability for a product improvement.135 
Indeed, courts and scholars routinely caution against allowing 
intent to substitute for anticompetitive effect in a relevant 
market.136 Nonetheless, intent arises frequently in antitrust cases, 
 
 134. Indeed, in some industries, immunizing monopolists from antitrust scrutiny 
might actually reduce net innovation. In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, 
innovation is often characterized by minor improvements that, because of the complex 
regulatory structure of drug approval and generic substitution, can have the effect of 
extending monopolies. As the Second Circuit noted in the Actavis case, “immunizing 
product hopping from antitrust scrutiny may deter significant innovation by 
encouraging manufacturers to focus on switching the market to trivial or minor 
product reformulations rather than investing in the research and development 
necessary to develop riskier, but medically significant innovations.” New York v. 
Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 659 (2d Cir. 2016); see generally Dogan & Lemley, supra 
note 99; Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 99; cf. Dotan Oliar, The Copyright-Innovation 
Tradeoff: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Intentional Infliction of Harm, 64 STAN. 
L. REV. 951 (2012) (contending that absolute immunity for infringement-enabling 
technologies would incentivize firms to maximize the harmful effects of such 
technologies). 
 135. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59 (“[I]n considering whether the monopolist’s conduct 
on balance harms competition and is therefore condemned as exclusionary for purposes 
of § 2, our focus is upon the effect of that conduct, not upon the intent behind it.”). 
 136. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at para. 775c (“An antitrust 
rule permitting juries to sift through records pertaining to the firm’s intent cannot help 
but chill perfectly appropriate behavior that the antitrust laws are intended to 
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with courts sometimes appearing to treat it as dispositive. In C.R. 
Bard v. M3 Systems,137 for example, Bard, the manufacturer of a 
biopsy gun, redesigned it, allegedly to destroy the compatibility of 
replacement needles made by competitors. M3, which sold 
replacement needles for the original gun, alleged that the redesign 
was made not to improve the product but to exclude competitors in 
the needle market. At trial, the jury ruled in M3’s favor. Over a 
fervent dissent by Judge Newman,138 a Federal Circuit panel 
upheld the jury’s verdict in an opinion that focused heavily on 
Bard’s intent: 
In order to prevail on its claim of an antitrust violation 
based on Bard’s modification of its Biopty gun to prevent 
the use of competing replacement needles, M3 was 
required to prove that Bard made [the] change . . . for 
predatory reasons, i.e., for the purpose of injuring 
competitors in the replacement needle market, rather 
than for improving the operation of the gun. . . . 
Although Bard contended at trial that it modified its 
Biopty gun to make it easier to load and unload, there 
was substantial evidence that Bard’s real reasons for 
modifying the gun were to raise the cost of entry to 
potential makers of replacement needles, to make doctors 
apprehensive about using non-Bard needles, and to 
preclude the use of ‘copycat’ needles.139 
C.R. Bard has attracted scholarly criticism for suggesting 
that exclusionary intent, alone, can support a monopolization 
claim.140 Read in context, however, the language regarding intent 
was probably not meant to encapsulate the requirements for a 
monopolization claim,141 but to address Bard’s argument that its 
product change was in fact an improvement that should be 
insulated from antitrust scrutiny. The jury had elsewhere decided 
in favor of M3 on the objective facts regarding anticompetitive 
impact—i.e., that Bard had monopoly power that it had acquired 
or maintained through exclusionary means.142 With market 
impact established, the court was focusing on Bard’s claim that its 
 
encourage.”). 
 137. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 138. Id. at 1372 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“[A]ntitrust jurisprudence has well 
understood that the enforcement of the antitrust laws is self-defeating if it chills or 
stifles innovation.”). 
 139. Id. at 1382 (emphasis added)(citations omitted). 
 140. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 13, at 40; Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 10, at 17 
(2012) (“The obvious perversity underlying this standard is that it substitutes 
subjective intent for market-based analysis that would calculate the actual price and 
innovation effects of a challenged form of innovation.”). 
 141. See C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1369–70. 
 142. Id. at 1382. 
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conduct was not exclusionary because the modification improved 
the product.143 Intent, in this view, could help to evaluate that 
claim—to demonstrate whether the exclusionary effects of the 
conduct resulted from real innovation or from changes that had 
the purpose and effect of blocking competition. Intent, in other 
words, serves as an evidentiary tool for evaluating the nature of 
the product change, rather than as an end in itself. 
This view of intent fits comfortably into the Microsoft 
balancing approach, with its inquiry into the overall competitive 
impact of a product design change. If a monopolist acted with 
primarily exclusionary motives, a fact-finder could reasonably 
conclude that the resulting product was likely to have primarily 
exclusionary effects. Less obviously, intent-as-evidence is also 
consistent with a robust form of the non-interference rule. Indeed, 
Allied Orthopedic itself anticipated that intent could play a role in 
evaluating whether a design change in fact improved the product: 
 
Evidence of an innovator’s initial intent may be 
helpful to the extent that it shows that the innovator 
knew all along that the new design was no better than 
the old design, and thus introduced the design solely 
to eliminate competition.144  
 
 Intent, in other words, can help the fact-finder to evaluate the 
credibility of a claim of product improvement. Even under 
absolute non-interference, if the evidence shows that a desire to 
improve the product played virtually no role in motivating a 
product change, then the “improvement” claim is pretextual, and 
an antitrust violation can be found. 
Finally, this notion of intent as evidence has implications for 
non-interference more generally, and reveals interesting parallels 
between the IP and antitrust versions of the non-interference 
principle. Generally, if non-interference aims to avoid interference 
with legitimate commerce, it does not require courts to immunize 
parties acting with illicit motives. If exclusionary goals motivated 
a product change, in other words, then antitrust condemnation of 
that change will not discourage future parties from improving 
their products in ways that benefit consumers; it will only 
discourage them from designing products with the explicit goal of 
excluding their competitors. Applying antitrust law in these 
circumstances will not interfere with legitimate trade or 
 
 143. See Medtronic Minimed Inc. v. Smiths Med. MD Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 578, 588 
(D. Del. 2005) (concluding that C.R. Bard’s focus on intent “should be understood in 
relation to Bard’s use of its patents and not be considered as referencing conduct that, 
standing alone, would necessitate a finding of predatory or exclusionary conduct”). 
 144. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 
1001 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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innovation. 
This view of antitrust non-interference also corresponds with 
its parallel in IP law. As discussed above, under the inducement 
doctrine, parties that intend to promote infringement cannot claim 
the benefits of the staple article doctrine in patent or copyright 
law. While inducement nominally focuses on intent as the focal 
point of analysis, I have suggested that intent serves as a proxy 
for an inquiry into a product’s overall purpose and effect. Products 
that are designed to infringe, mainly used to infringe, and 
profitable only because of infringement, would not have existed in 
the absence of infringement; imposing liability in such cases does 
not interfere with lawful trade. Likewise, in the antitrust context, 
a focus on intent can keep non-interference true to its goal of 
avoiding interference with legitimate business decisions, rather 
than immunizing behavior whose primary purpose and effect are 
exclusionary. 
 
4. The No-Economic-Sense Test 
 
Another analytical tool commonly proposed by commentators 
asks whether the monopolist’s decision would have made economic 
sense in the absence of its exclusionary effects.145 In other words, 
the test asks whether the conduct would have been “unprofitable 
for the defendant but for the exclusion of rivals and resulting 
supra-competitive recoupment.”146 This test is more protective of 
innovation than competitive balancing because it allows 
innovations whose exclusionary effects predominate as long as 
their beneficiary features are enough to justify their development 
costs.147 But it is less defendant-protective than absolute non-
interference because it condemns some innovations that reflect 
real improvements in the product.148 
If the goal of non-interference is to protect against 
interference with lawful conduct, then the no-economic-sense test 
has significant appeal. Admittedly, like many of its alternatives, it 
 
 145. See Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 99, at 40–45. 
 146. A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary 
Conduct—Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 389 (2006). 
 147. It also offers greater cover than a related alternative, the “profit-sacrifice 
model,” which critics have argued improperly condemns some innovations that require 
short-term sacrifice but bring long-term benefits both to the monopolist and to 
consumers. See, e.g., Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and 
the Dominant Firm, 14 (Univ. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 07–19, 2007), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014153 (contending that profit-sacrifice test “does not 
adequately distinguish anticompetitive ‘sacrifice’ from procompetitive ‘investment’”). 
 148. See generally Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of 
Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 49 (1981) (noting that 
under the no-economic-sense test, “technological superiority” does not necessarily 
insulate a monopolist; instead, “a new system is immune from a finding of predation if 
and only if the value to consumers of the new system relative to the preexisting system 
is greater than the required development costs”).  
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raises complex factual questions about the anticipated economic 
value of innovations whose future applications are yet unknown. 
These questions are complicated, moreover, by the challenge of 
reconstructing the decision in hindsight. And the approach may 
well impede some technologies that could have dramatic 
unforeseen benefits. The alternative, however, fails to 
acknowledge that product changes themselves can impose 
substantial social costs. In the pharmaceutical context, for 
example, firms making minor product improvements can forestall 
generic competition that could save billions of dollars for 
consumers, insurers, and the government.149 Despite legitimate 
concerns about judicial meddling in innovation, a complete hands-
off approach would unnecessarily immunize socially costly 
conduct. 
Like the intent inquiry, the no-economic-sense test finds an 
analog in the IP context. In Sony, the Supreme Court described 
the staple article doctrine as designed to protect sellers’ rights 
“freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”150 
If a product or a business model would not make economic sense 
but for its role in infringement, that product or business model is 
not “substantially unrelated” to IP interests. The no-economic-
sense test thus corresponds to a normative reading of Sony as 
seeking to balance competing interests, rather than blindly 
protecting innovation.151 
III. THE FUTURE OF NON-INTERFERENCE: SOME MODEST 
SUGGESTIONS 
The non-interference principle serves an important role in 
both IP and antitrust law. Our competitive economy operates on a 
baseline assumption that market forces will ordinarily bring about 
the best outcomes, and that judicial intervention is the exception, 
rather than the rule. The judicial reluctance to question design 
choices in both IP and antitrust law responds to this assumption, 
as well as to particularized concerns about the limits of judicial 
competence, the risks of chilling legitimate conduct, and the costs 
of blocking access to innovation for lawful use. 
In both areas of law, however, courts have recognized that 
complete immunity for innovators could frustrate the law’s 
fundamental normative goals. Absolute non-interference would be 
costly both in the short term and over time. In the short term, it 
would let stand behavior that imposes net harms on society, thus 
reducing consumer welfare in the process. Perhaps more 
 
 149. See generally Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 99 at 33 (“On a blockbuster 
drug, a product hop can deprive consumers of $1 billion or more in cost savings, with 
little, no, or negative gain in product quality.”). 
 150. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
 151. See generally Dogan, supra note 47. 
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significantly, it would create cover for firms contemplating illicit 
action, and could, in some industries, incentivize investment in 
minor improvements rather than expensive, groundbreaking new 
products. 
One’s view of the appropriate balance between non-
interference and other normative values turns largely on one’s 
instincts about the relative importance of the respective values in 
our economy and society. Some courts and scholars inherently 
distrust antitrust law as a disciplining mechanism in markets. 
They view the likelihood of anticompetitive single-firm behavior as 
rare, and the risk of over-deterrence substantial in comparison.152 
Others view exclusionary behavior by monopolists as 
unsurprising, tempting, and costly to consumers, and worth 
deterring with robust antitrust rules.153 On the copyright side, the 
roles are often reversed, with antitrust skeptics more sympathetic 
to copyright holders’ claims against innovators who enable 
infringement,154 and antitrust optimists raising alarms over 
copyright holders’ interference with budding technologies.155 This 
dichotomy between non-interference advocates in IP and antitrust 
law may explain, at least partially, why scholars have devoted so 
little attention to it as a generalized rule. 
By focusing attention on non-interference across these two 
disciplines, this essay seeks to understand why courts defer to 
technology design and whether that rationale has limits, either 
internally or through deference to IP or antitrust interests. It 
concludes that the purposes of non-interference all center on 
interference—the notion that judges should not slow the wheels of 
legitimate commerce in the hope of restraining illicit behavior. In 
both IP and antitrust, however, this goal does not justify the 
strictest version of the non-interference principle. Instead, courts 
and commentators have devised a series of doctrines and tools 
designed to minimize interference, while preserving the law’s role 
in reducing infringement and targeting exclusionary behavior. 
These tools cluster around several core considerations, which 
should continue to guide courts as they develop and refine the 
legal rules: 
 
 152. See Posner, supra note 23 at 932 (2001) (describing his view as “skeptical—but 
no stronger word would be correct—about the danger to competition that is posed by 
unilateral firm action, unilateral in the special sense that it does not require 
cooperation with competitors (it usually requires cooperation with customers or 
suppliers). The approach emphasizes both the difficulty of squashing competition by 
such means and the danger that heavy-handed antitrust enforcement may suppress a 
practice that may seem anticompetitive but actually is efficient, or at least neutral, 
from the broader social standpoint.”). 
 153. E.g., Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 99. 
 154. E.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 651–53 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(contemplating liability against intermediary for enabling copyright infringement). 
 155. E.g., Carrier, supra note 29 (discussing role of peer-to-peer copyright litigation 
in chilling innovation in digital music space). 
DOGAN DESIGN IN IP AND ANTITRUST  11/1/16 12:45 PM 
2016] DOGAN DESIGN IN IP AND ANTITRUST 135 
Incentives. What incentives do we want to create for firms 
engaged in product innovation? Rules should evolve in a way that 
encourages robust competition and product innovation, and 
frustrates gamesmanship to evade liability. 
Segregating effects. If firms can avoid liability simply by 
blending an anti-competitive change with a marginally beneficial 
one (or an infringement-directed feature with a more neutral one), 
they will do so. At the very least, courts should remain open to 
examining the relative effects of different aspects of a product 
modification, to determine whether certain harmful features could 
be eliminated or changed without threatening the innovation’s 
beneficial aspects. In particular, in both IP and antitrust, if the 
court can identify a design choice that had no purpose but to 
exclude, to enable infringement, or to evade detection, then courts 
should not hesitate to impose liability. Getting into the weeds is 
not costless, but if courts refuse ever to do it, it is too easy for 
firms to engage in subterfuge and accomplish unlawful objectives. 
First principles, not wooden benchmarks. In both IP and 
antitrust, courts should redirect their focus toward normative 
considerations, rather than empty benchmarks, in applying the 
non-interference principle. We need greater attention to why 
courts leave technology alone—is it because technological advance 
is always a good thing, or because we do not want IP or antitrust 
claimants to interfere with legitimate trade? I think it is the 
latter—which is why I like “non-interference” to describe these 
doctrines. But either way, rules should emerge in a way that 
promotes an articulated normative goal, rather than refining the 
meaning of “substantial.” 
 
